Fordham Law Review
Volume 5

Issue 2

Article 9

1936

Obiter Dicta

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Obiter Dicta, 5 Fordham L. Rev. 378 (1936).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol5/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

OBITER DICTA
,;An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*

SUPPLEMENTARY RELIEF FOR THE MORTGAGOR

In no field of jurisprudence has the mollifying influence of equity been more pronounced than in the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee. The translation of the equity
of redemption out of the harsh and exact terms of the mortgage bond constitutes "the most magnificent triumph of
Equity and
equity over the injustice of the common law." 1 PoMEaoY,
Deficiency JudgEQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 162. Today we
ments
are facing in mortgage law another contest between the "rigor
of the law" and the "conscience of equity." What will be the result?
With the advent of the depression, the foreclosure sale produced a single bid and a
single bidder. The mortgagee bought the mortgaged property at his own figure. In
addition to the loss of his property, the mortgagor faced a deficiency judgment for
the major part of the original mortgage indebtedness. Sensing the inequities of that
situation, the New York Legislature, assembled in special session, passed an emergency amendment to Section 1083 of the Civil Practice Act [Laws Ex. Sess. 1933,
c. 794], providing that the deficiency judgment might be entered only for the difference between the "fair" value of the property and the mortgage indebtedness. The
Court of Appeals held that the given amendment did not operate retroactively. Foeibcr
Realty Corp. v. Abel, 265 N. Y. 94, 191 N. E. 847 (1934).
At once the courts were confronted with the question: Did the legislative fiat
close the door to equitable action in relation to deficiency judgments not expressly
within Section 1083a of the Civil Practice Act? Justice
McGeehan in Dry Dock Savings Institution v. Harriman
Equity
Realty Co., 150 Misc. 860, 861, 270 N. Y. Supp. 428, 430
versus
(Sup. Ct. 1934), said in vigorous terms: "Chancery does
Legislature
not now, any more than it ever did, need the fiat of the
Legislature to allow it to prevent the rigid rules of law from working injustice."
It was likewise stated in the case of Monaghan v. May, 242 App. Div. 64, 65, 273 N. Y.
Supp. 475, 478 (2d Dep't 1934), that a court of equity has the power to determine,
even in the absence of statute, the fair value of foreclosed property and to assess a
deficiency judgment accordingly. The Court of Appeals, however, in Emigrant Say.
Bank v. Von Bokkelen, 269 N. Y. 110, 116, 199 N. E. 23, 25 (1935), said in a dictum:
"Perhaps it should be said that we do not approve the decision in Monaghan v. May."
In the face of this dictum, the Appellate Division, in the case of Guaranteed Title &
Mortgage Co: v. Sheffres, 285 N. Y. Supp. 464, 465 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1936), said
of Monaghan v. May, supra: "Its doctrine was not an innovation. It was a modern
restatement of an anciently exercised power. The soundness of that far reaching and
basic doctrine should not be abandoned by this court until the Court of Appeals has
before it a case in which the question is squarely presented." Thus stands New
York law at the moment.
Interesting questions present themselves in connection with the stated issue: Does
the merger of law and equity in New York mean that the principles of equity are
*
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submerged? See N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1920) § 8. Throughout the history of the
law, equity has traditionally assumed the role of protector of the mortgagor. The
instant emergency seems to give rise to a similar opportunity for equity to intervene
even in the absence of the affirmative mandate of the Legislature. The classic definition of equity comes to mind: "In some cases it is necessary to leave the words of
the law, and to follow what reason and justice requireth, and to that intent, equity is
ordained, that is to say, to temper and mitigate the rigor of the law." Docron AND
STUDENT,

Dialogue I, c. 16.

A SOPHISTICATED YOUTH
The clamoring of the realist against the precedent-buttressed fortress of common
law principles is not always "sound and fury signifying nothing." Perhaps nowhere
is his cause more forcefully pleaded, and nowhere the
stubbornness of stare decisi more clearly revealed than in
The Shield of
the pages of the New York reports on the question of infants'
Infancy
liability stemming from contract. The rationale behind the
common law rule which permitted the infant to avoid his contract was grounded
in a concept of infancy hMmost completely outmoded in this modem day and age.
Fashioned as a shield to protect artless youth from the enticements of a mature
salescraft, the defense has become a many-edged weapon which can be wielded
with disastrous efficacy against a now thoroughly routed adult adversary.
Your modem infant may go so far as to induce the adult to enter into the contract
by misrepresenting his age. The Court of Appeals has ruled not only that he is
not estopped to plead the defense of infancy [Intcrnational
Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722
The Shield
(1912)], but that the misrepresentation, when pleaded as a
Becomes a
defense by an adult defendant in an action brought by the
Sword
infant as plaintiff, is insufficient in law [Sternlicb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E. 726 (1934)], and this though the
infant be barely under the magic age of twenty-one. Further, since the controversy
though tainted with fraud arises ex contractu, the infant may not be sued in tort.
Collins v. Gifford, 203 N. Y. 465, 96 N. E. 721 (1911). Even where the suit is
based on a wilful breach of warranty, a form evolved from the common law tort
action in deceit, the infant is impregnable behind his wall of precedent. See 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 246.
A ray of hope pierced the darkness of the adult world when it was decided that
an infant seeking to rescind his purchase of a bicycle must make monetary restitution for its use and depreciation. Rice v. Butter, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275
(1899). The joker in this situation lies concealed in the fact that had he made a
more thorough job of wrecking the bicycle, the infant would not have been obliged
to make any restitution. A more recent decision, distinguishing the case of securities
which were worthless when tendered back to the vendor, protected the infant to
the full amount of the purchase price. Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp.,
152 Misc. 303, 273 N. Y. Supp. 229 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The climax is capped by a
holding that these speculating infants are exempt from the statutory assessments
on holders of bank stocks, although this is a liability sounding in quasi contract.
Broderick v. Aaron, 266 N. Y. 506, 195 N. E. 175 (1935).
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It is a far cry from bicycles to bank stocks. The legal heart may melt at the
spectacle of improvident youth succumbing to the wily temptings of sellers of
alluring unnecessaries. But it would seem that the ballast
The Counter
has shifted and today the unfortunate adult is more in need
of protection than our modern infant. Chief Judge Crane
Attack
issued what must frankly be termed a broad hint to the
legislature in Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 251,
188 N. E. 726, 728 (1934), when be went so far as to cite verbatim an Iowa statute
changing the common law, and concluded his recognition of the New York law
with this unenthusiastic dictum, "Well, the law is as it is, and the duty of this court
is to give force and effect to the decisions as we find them".

AN INEFFECTUAL WEAPON
A growing tide of lawlessness presented a problem to the legislators of New York
State. This they determined to solve by forging new weapons to be used in the
grim warfare against the forces of organized crime. As
one result of aroused popular demand there was added to
The Weapon
the arsenal of the criminal law the so-called Public Enemy
Law. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 1921, PENAL LAw § 722 (11). This statute was intended
to enable prosecutors to reach the leaders of the rackets, too clever to be convicted
for the crimes which everyone knew they were vicariously committing. The statute
created a new species of disorderly conduct, making it an offense for a person of
evil reputation to consort with criminals, for an unlawful purpose and with intent
to breach the peace. To relieve the prosecution of the always difficult task of proving
in the first instance the double intent essential to the crime, the mere fact of consorting was made prima facie evidence of intent, placing upon the defendant the
burden of explanation.
The weapon having been created, two tests were necessary: its practical effectiveness and its ability to withstand the counter-assault of unconstitutionality. Three
cases were consolidated and brought before the Court of
The Crucible
Appeals. People v. Pieri, 269 N. Y. 315, 199 N. E. 495
(1936). As construed by the court, the statute was shown
to be constitutional beyond the shadow of a doubt. Little solace, however, must
the decision have afforded the law enforcement agencies of the state, while great
indeed must have been the rejoicing among those gentlemen whose livelihood is
obtained by "ways that are dark and tricks that are vain". For in reversing the judgments of conviction upon the ground that the People in each instance had failed to
make out a case the court reduced the effectiveness of the statute as an anti-crime
weapon to approximately a minus-infinity.
It seems almost impossible to quarrel with the court's disposition of the cases,
The presumptive intents arise only after proof of the other essential facts. Proof
of the defendant's evil reputation presents no difficulty. But
what is a "criminal"? The mere existence of a formidable
Where Lies
criminal record or of an evil reputation or of both does not
the Flaw?
necessarily make its possessor a "criminal". To determine
when a particular person is a criminal seems a well nigh impossible task. This same
vagueness attaches to the term "consorting". For example, in one of the cases before
the court a meeting for a period of two minutes was held not to constitute "consorting".
In the light of the court's decision the potential big gun fashioned by the legislature
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reveals itself as a bean shooter. Responsibility for the inefficacy of the statute lies
with the legislature, not the court. But perhaps the war against crime does not
require new weapons. Efficiency in law enforcement would obviate their necesstiy.

THE DRAMA OF THE SUPREME CoURT
Amidst all the vigorous pamphleteering and proselytizing being conducted today on
the dialectics of constitutionalism and the powers of the Supreme Court, it is remarkable what comparatively little attention has been devoted to the modus operandi of judicial review and the e.xpediThe
ency of the current procedural pattern. Over and above the
TVA
categories of jurisdiction prescribed in the Constitution,
Decision
there has arisen a separate body of doctrine purporting to
determine whether the issues presented in a particular case are susceptible of judicial disposition. In the concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in the recent TVA
case [Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 56 Sup. CL 466, 480 (1936)],
there appears a succinct and comprehensive statement of the formulae and refinements of justiciability as they have been developed by the Court, pursuant to its policy
of yielding only to absolute necessity in exercising its power to review the constitutionality of legislation.
Our threefold form of government was established to afford protection against
bureaucracy. In behalf of the continued existence of the judicial review, the doctrine
of Marbury v. Madison is reiterated. It is urged that the
power of the Court evolved only as a necessary concomitant
Separation
of the primary design, in that no other method obtained to
of
secure adherence to the organic law. Thus, to curtail that
Power
prerogative would disrupt the unity of the tripartite scheme,
subject our polity to the autocratic and vacillating temper of legislative bodies and
plunge our national sovereignty into a chaos of competing entities. See McBain, The
Issue: Court or Congress? N. Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1936, § 7 at 1. A less pessimistic
view of the consequences of such action is taken by those who, without disputing the
integrity of the Court or the bona fides of its intentions, regard the judicial veto as an
unwarranted interference with the processes of democracy and an unsalutary influence upon social progress. See Lerner, The Riddle of the Supreme Court (1936)
142 NATIOx 121; id. at 213; id. at 273; id. at 379. The fundamental issue creating
this sharp division of opinion is thus seen to be essentially political, involving conflicting views as to the nature of government and its efficacy as a medium of attaining social
security and economic stability.
The suggestion, however, that the retroactive operation of judicial action has outlived its usefulness in constitutional law and is itself an independent factor strongly
contributing to our national maladjustment, might well bear
inquiry. See Gartner, When Should the Constitutionality of
Adjudication
Acts of Congress be Determined, During Enactment or Years
versus
After-ward? (1935) 24 GEo. L. J. 98. The cautious approach
Advice
of the Court in the TVA decision, and the deliberate circumscribing of the issues, left unsettled and still open to attack the broader and more
significant aspects of that legislative program. Comment has recently been directed
to the practise of the Court of going beyond the immediate necessities of a particular case and thereby giving its decision a prospective effect. See Albertsworth, Advisory Functions of the Federal Supreme Court (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 643. Further
evidence of this tendency has been discerned in the Railroad Pension and Schechter
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cases. See Powell, Commerce, Pensions and Codes (1935) 49 HaIv. L. RFv. 1. The
narrow scope of the TVA decision indicates the elusive character of this advisory
function and the possible abandonment of the policy. The slim margin by which the
Court was able to render an opinion on the merits induces speculation as to the widespread confusion and uncertainty which would have resulted had jurisdiction actually
been denied and even the limited adjudication deferred. To avoid contingencies of
this character, a procedure similar to that of the advisory opinion now employed
in several state jurisdictions has been suggested, the effect of which would be to
preserve the institution of judicial review and at the same time to facilitate the
immediate determination of the propriety of legislative activities. See Comment
(1936) 5 FORDEAm L. REv. 94. While the scheme has been objected to as subversive
of our traditional system of balance of power and as conducive to a myopic evaluation
of the facts in any given case, its advantage would seem to lie in the compromise it
might establish between the two seemingly irreconcilable schools of thought on the
desirability of judicial supremacy.
In view of the very strong probability that the electorate will witness no little
agitation on the entire subject in the approaching campaign, it would be highly regrettable if no concerted effort were made by the legal fraternity to present these
issues on a level somewhat more enlightening than the invective and pessimism of
political slogans and cliches.

